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We consider a receding horizon approach as an approximate solution to two-person zero-sum
Markov games with infinite horizon discounted cost and average cost criteria. We first present
error bounds from the optimal equilibrium value of the game when both players take correlated
equilibrium receding horizon policies that are based on exact or approximate solutions of receding
finite horizon subgames. Motivated by the worst-case optimal control of queueing systems by
Altman [1], we then analyze error bounds when the minimizer plays the (approximate) receding
horizon control and the maximizer plays the worst case policy. We give three heuristic examples
of the approximate receding horizon control. We extend “rollout” by Bertsekas and Castanon [9]
and “parallel rollout” and “hindsight optimization” by Chang et al. [13, 16] into the Markov
game setting within the framework of the approximate receding horizon approach and analyze
their performances. From the rollout/parallel rollout approaches, the minimizing player seeks
to improve the performance of a single heuristic policy it rolls out or to combine dynamically
multiple heuristic policies in a set to improve the performances of all of the heuristic policies
simultaneously under the guess that the maximizing player has chosen a fixed worst-case policy.
Given ε > 0, we give the value of the receding horizon which guarantees that the parallel rollout
policy with the horizon played by the minimizer dominates any heuristic policy in the set by
ε. From the hindsight optimization approach, the minimizing player makes a decision based on
his expected optimal hindsight performance over a finite horizon. We finally discuss practical
implementations of the receding horizon approaches via simulation.
Keywords: Markov game, receding horizon control, infinite horizon cost, rollout, hindsight opti-
mization
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1 Introduction
Game Theory has been used to model dynamic sequential decision making problems in a wide
variety of situations where multiple decision makers compete or cooperate to optimize their cost
functionals. In this paper, we consider games with two players where one player (the minimizer)
wishes to minimize his cost that will be paid to the other player (the maximizer). Both players
take underlying decisions simultaneously at each state, with the complete knowledge of the state
of the system but without knowing each other’s current action being taken. We can view the
maximizer as nature which controls the disturbances that are unknown to the minimizer [39]. The
minimizer then tries to get the best performance under the worst possible dynamic choice of the
unknown disturbance parameters controlled by nature. That is, the minimizer seeks to design a
robust controller that works well under the worst case scenario [6]. This gives rise to two-person
zero-sum Markov games.
Recently, Markov games have received an attention in the queueing system literature in order
to solve interesting telecommunication network problems, for example, admission control, routing,
flow control, etc. (see, e.g., Altman’s paper [1] and the references therein and [24]). However, even
though the worst-case scenario1 that will be played by the maximizer can be analyzed for some
problems, it is often quite difficult to obtain such a policy exactly. In that case, the natural step
for the minimizer is to “guess” the seemingly worst possible play of the maximizer and then try to
optimize his performance. If the minimizer assumes that the maximizer will play a fixed policy, to
the minimizer the problem becomes solving a Markov decision process (MDP) [42]. It is well-known
that solving MDPs in general (for infinite horizon cost) is often impractical if the state space is
large even though exact solution techniques are available, e.g., value iteration or policy iteration,
etc. (see, e.g., [42] for a substantial discussion). This means that even with the minimizer’s guess
on the opponent’s play, getting the best performance for him is difficult.
With this motivation, we focus on solving two-person zero-sum Markov games with infinite
horizon discounted cost and infinite horizon average cost criteria via an approximation framework
in the context of “planning”. We adopt a receding horizon control approach. The idea is to obtain
an optimal solution with respect to a “small” moving horizon at each decision time and apply the
solution to the system. In fact, this approach has been studied in several contexts in various fields,
e.g., planning in economics [27], model predictive control literature [29, 34, 35], and planning in
MDPs [23, 13], etc. In the game setting, Baglietto et al. [5] applied team theory [25] empirically with
a receding horizon control to solve a routing problem in a communication network by formulating
the problem as a nonlinear optimal control problem, and Van den Broek [12] considered a receding
horizon control in non-zero sum differential games [12], specifically analyzing the performance of
1What we mean by the worst case scenario is the case when the maximizer plays his optimal equilibrium policy
that we define later.
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linear quadratic games. The receding horizon control he employed is somewhat different from what
we do here. In his case, at any decision time, the players base their actions on a finite horizon but
at each decision time, the horizon size increases. This paper focuses on a fixed receding horizon
size.
At each state, the minimizing player selects a small but typical horizon and solves the given
Markov game with the finite horizon (called the subgame) under the guess that the maximizing
player makes his decision based on his best performance for the subgame. The minimizing player
then takes a randomized action based on the solution to the subgame. The intuition is that if the
horizon is “long” enough to get a stationary behavior of the game, this moving horizon control
would have a good performance. Indeed, we first show that the value of the game played by the
receding horizon control from both players converges geometrically fast, with given discount factor
in (0,1) for infinite horizon discounted cost and with given “ergodicity coefficient” in (0,1) for infinite
horizon average cost, to the optimal equilibrium value of the game, uniformly in the initial state, as
the value of the moving horizon increases (Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre [23] obtained a similar
result for MDPs [23]). We mention here that this error analysis assumes that the maximizing
player also plays his respective half of a common copy of the approach, resulting in a so-called
correlated equilibrium. In other words, the maximizer also plays the receding horizon control like
the minimizer. We then present an error bound between the optimal equilibrium value and the
value of the game in which the minimizer plays the receding horizon control and the maximizer
plays the worst case scenario (playing the equilibrium policy), which also vanishes to zero as the
size of the receding horizon goes to infinity. This also answers an important question that arises in
the Markov game literature: what size of the planning horizon should the minimizer use to achieve
a good approximate value of the equilibrium value?
However, as we mentioned before, solving the finite horizon Markov game or subgame is also
troublesome if the state space is large. So we consider an approximate receding horizon control.
Rather than solving the finite horizon subgames exactly at each decision time, at each state, the
minimizer will make his decision based on the approximate solution for the subgame. We also
analyze the performance of this approach as previously done for the receding horizon control in
MDP contexts [15].
We then shift our attention to some examples of the approximate receding horizon control
for the minimizer. These are all heuristics where the minimizer guesses the maximizer’s worst
case scenario and approximates the solution of the subgame and takes a decision based on this
approximate solution, and all of these heuristics can be implemented via a simple Monte-Carlo
simulation. The first two approaches that will be taken by the minimizer aim at improving a
given heuristic policy (or a set of multiple heuristic policies) that is available to the minimizer,
based on policy improvement arguments. We first consider an adaptation of the rollout approach
by Bertsekas and Castanon [9] into the Markov game setting. In this approach, the minimizer
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guesses the maximizer’s worst possible play and uses a single heuristic policy to rollout to generate
a new policy whose performance in terms of the value of the game will be no worse than the given
heuristic policy if the maximizer indeed plays the policy the minimizer guessed. To the minimizer,
it will be often true that he has more than one heuristic policy available such that a particular
heuristic policy’s performance is near-otimal for the particular sample paths of the system. He may
well try to combine these policies dynamically. The next approach, called parallel rollout [13], is a
generalization of the rollout approach. It also appeals to the policy improvement principle and can
show that for any fixed policy taken by the maximizer, the minimizer will improve the performances
of all heuristic policies simultaneously if the minimizer plays the parallel rollout with respect to the
fixed policy of the maximizer. In other words, the parallel rollout is a formal method of generating
a policy that dominates all heuristic policies available. Based on the analysis of the approximate
receding horizon control we will present in this paper, we can say that if the minimizer’s guess on
the opponent’s play is good and the resulting approximate value of the subgame is also good, the
two approaches will yield a reasonable performance to the minimizer. Furthermore, given ε > 0, we
provide the value of the receding horizon which guarantees that for any fixed policy played by the
maximizer, the parallel rollout policy with the finite horizon played by the minimizer with respect
to the fixed policy of the maximizer yields a value of the game no larger than that of the game
played by any policy among heuristic policies by the minimizer and by the fixed policy chosen by
the maximizer plus ε.
The final example approach is motivated by hindsight optimization proposed in [13, 16]. By this
approach, at each state, the minimizer evaluates his candidate randomized actions based on the
analysis of the expected optimal hindsight performance over a finite horizon under the assumption
that the maximizer plays the worst-case fixed policy that chosen by the minimizer. This approach
has a flavor of heuristically adapting the hindsight optimal solutions into on-line solutions (via
on-line simulation).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formalize mathematically the Markov
games we consider. We then introduce the (approximate) receding horizon control in Section 3
and analyze performances. We then discuss three heuristics for the approximate receding horizon
control in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss implementation issues and other research directions.
2 Markov Game
In this section, we formulate the two-person zero-sum Markov game introduced by Shapley [44] in
a formal mathematical setting. For a substantial discussion on this topic, see, e.g., [18] [7] or [40].
Let X denote a finite state space and for x ∈ X, N(x) and M(x) denote the finite sets of actions
for the minimizing player (minimizer) and the maximizing player (maximizer), respectively. Both
players play underlying actions simultaneously at each state, with the complete knowledge of the
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state of the system but without knowing each other’s current action being taken. At each state
x, each player will consider choosing an action to take according to a probability distribution over
the available actions. For each x ∈ X, we define the players’ “admissible randomized action sets”
as G(x) and F (x) such that
G(x) = {g ∈ R|N(x)||
∑
i∈N(x)
gi = 1, and ∀i, gi ≥ 0}
F (x) = {f ∈ R|M(x)||
∑
i∈M(x)
fi = 1, and ∀i, fi ≥ 0}
Once the actions n ∈ N(x) and m ∈M(x) at state x are taken by both players, the state transitions
probabilistically to next state y according to the probability p(y|x, n,m). From this, we induce the
probability Pxy(g, f) denoting the probability of transitioning from state x to state y under the







If the minimizer takes a randomized action g ∈ G(x) and the maximizer takes f ∈ F (x) at state x,








c(x, y, n,m)p(y|x, n,m)gnfm,
where c(x, y, n,m) is the immediate payoff to the minimizer (the negative of this will be incurred
to the maximizer) associated with a current state and the next state pair (x, y) after taking the
action n ∈ N(x) if action m is taken by the maximizer. We assume that |Cx(g, f)| ≤ Cmax <∞ for
any x, g and f . We now define a stationary policy π or strategy of the minimizer to be a function
π : X → G(X) and denote Π as the set of all possible policies, and similarly a policy φ and the set
Φ are defined for the maximizer. We will say that a stationary policy is pure, if the randomized
action selected by the policy at every state yields a non-randomized action choice, i.e., an action is
selected with probability one.
In this paper, we consider two objective function criteria: infinite horizon discounted cost
and average cost. Given a policy π selected by the minimizer and a policy φ selected by the
maximizer, we define the value of the game played with π and φ by the minimizer and the maximizer,
respectively, with a starting state x as
V∞(π, φ)(x) := E{
∞∑
t=0
γtCxt(π(xt), φ(xt))|x0 = x}
for the infinite horizon discounted cost criterion, where xt is a random variable denoting the state
at time t following the policies π and φ, and γ ∈ (0, 1) is a given discount factor. The discount
factor can be interpreted as the probability that the game will be allowed to continue after the
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current decisions made by both players. Similarly, we define the value of the game for the infinite
horizon average cost criterion as







Cxt(π(xt), φ(xt))|x0 = x}
with given policies π and φ.
The goal of the minimizer (the maximizer) is to find a policy π ∈ Π (φ ∈ Φ) which minimizes
(maximizes) the value of the game. Throughout this paper, V∞ always refers to the value of the
game with the infinite horizon discounted cost criterion and J∞ refers to the value of the game
with the infinite horizon average cost criterion, so that we will omit which criterion we mention at
any point if the context is clear.
2.1 Some preliminaries
2.1.1 Infinite horizon discounted cost
It is well-known (see, e.g., [40]) that there exists an optimal equilibrium policy pair π∗ ∈ Π and
φ∗ ∈ Φ such that for all π ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ and x ∈ X,
V∞(π∗, φ)(x) ≤ V∞(π∗, φ∗)(x) ≤ V∞(π, φ∗)(x).
We will refer to the value V∞(π∗, φ∗)(x) as the equilibrium value of the game associated with state
x and to π∗ and φ∗ as the equilibrium policies for the minimizer and the maximizer, respectively.
We will write V∞(π∗, φ∗) as V ∗∞ and focus on finding or approximating the policy π∗ (note that
the content of this paper can be interpreted for the maximizer case by changing the role of the
minimizer and the maximizer). A primitive but important notion that arises in game theory is that
of dominance (see, e.g., [19]). We will say that a policy π1 ∈ Π (weakly) dominates π2 ∈ Π if and
only if for any φ ∈ Φ, V∞(π1, φ) ≤ V∞(π2, φ).
Now let B(X) be the space of real-valued bounded measurable functions on X endowed with
the supremum norm ‖V ‖ = supx |V (x)| for V ∈ B(X). We define several operators that map a
function in B(X) to a function in B(X): for all π ∈ Π, φ ∈ Φ, V ∈ B(X), and x ∈ X,















Tφ(V )(x) = inf
g∈G(x)







Markov games: receding horizon approach 7
Tπ(V )(x) = sup
f∈F (x)







It is well-known [18, 40] that each of the above operators is a contraction mapping in B(X),
that is, for the case of T , for any V1 and V2 in B(X), ‖T (V1)−T (V2)‖ ≤ γ‖V1−V2‖, and that each
operator has a monotonicity property, that is, if V1(x) ≤ V2(x) for all x ∈ X, T (V1)(x) ≤ T (V2)(x)
for all x ∈ X for the case of T . Furthermore, there exist a unique fixed point v ∈ B(X) such that
T (v) = v and v is equal to V∞(π∗, φ∗), and a unique fixed point u ∈ B(X) such that Tπ,φ(u) = u
and u = V∞(π, φ). We finally remark that for all x ∈ X, the infimum and supremum in the
definitions of the operators T , Tφ, and Tπ are achieved by elements in G(x) and F (x) (see, e.g.,
Section 3 in [38] or [40]).
Let {V ∗n } be the sequence of value iteration functions V ∗n := T (V ∗n−1) where n = 1, 2, ... and
let V ∗0 be an arbitrary function in B(X), but we assume that maxx |V ∗0 (x)| ≤ Cmax/(1 − γ) for
a technical reason. It is straightforward to show that as n → ∞, V ∗n converges to V∞(π∗, φ∗)
geometrically fast in γ by the contraction mapping property and the Banach fixed point theorem.
Furthermore, V ∗n is the equilibrium value of the finite n-horizon game. We introduce a nonstationary
or time-dependent policy for the minimizer π̃ = {π0, π1, ..., } where πi ∈ Π and denote the set of
all possible nonstationary policies as Π̃ and similarly define for the maximizer. Then V ∗n (x) is the
value of the game when starting in state x, both players play their own equilibrium nonstationary
policies for the n-horizon game with the terminal cost of V ∗0 (see, e.g., [1, 46]) and is given by







γtCxt(πt(xt), φt(xt)) + γ
nV ∗0 (xn)|x0 = x}
for x ∈ X.
2.1.2 Infinite horizon average cost
Unlike the discounted cost case, it is not true that there always exists an equilibrium value for
average cost Markov games [21] in general. We make following assumption:
Assumption 2.1 The Markov chain associated with each pair of any pure policies is irreducible
and there exists ρ > 0 such that for any π ∈ Φ and φ ∈ Φ and x ∈ X,
Pxx(π(x), φ(x)) ≥ ρ.
The first assumption implies that the underlying Markov chain is a recurrent unichain and the
second assumption is the strong aperiodicity2 condition.
2This aperiodicity assumption is not a serious assumption (see, e.g., page 231 in [46]).
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Under Assumption 2.1, there exists an optimal equilibrium policy pair π∗ ∈ Π and φ∗ ∈ Φ such
that for all π ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ and x ∈ X,
J∞(π∗, φ)(x) ≤ J∞(π∗, φ∗)(x) ≤ J∞(π, φ∗), (x).
and in fact, each term in the above inequalities is independent of the initial state x so that we can
omit x in each term above [46]. Furthermore, π∗ (φ∗) here will be a different policy in general from
the equilibrium policy for the discounted cost case. We will abuse the notation for our convenience
and what we refer to will be clear from our presentation. We will refer to the value J∞(π∗, φ∗) as
the equilibrium value of the game and to π∗ and φ∗ as the equilibrium policies for the minimizer
and the maximizer, respectively, similar to the discounted case. We will write J∞(π∗, φ∗) as J∗∞
and focus on finding or approximating the policy π∗. The dominance notion is also similarly
defined: we will say that a policy π1 ∈ Π (weakly) dominates π2 ∈ Π if and only if for any φ ∈ Φ,
J∞(π1, φ) ≤ J∞(π2, φ).
We define several operators that map a function in B(X) to a function in B(X): for all π ∈
Π, φ ∈ Φ, V ∈ B(X), and x ∈ X,

































It is well-known (see, e.g., [18, 40, 46]) that each of the above operators has a monotonicity
property and the infimum and supremum in the definitions of the operators T̄ , T̄φ, and T̄π are
achieved by elements in G(x) and F (x).
Let {V̄ ∗n } be the sequence of value iteration functions with respect to T̄ , V̄ ∗n := T̄ (V̄ ∗n−1) where
n = 1, 2, ... and V̄ ∗0 is arbitrary function in B(X). It has been shown [46] (under Assumption 2.1
on average Markov games) that as n→∞, V̄ ∗n converges to a function V̄ ∗∞ ∈ B(X) that satisfies




∞(x) for all x ∈ X.
Furthermore, V̄ ∗n is the equilibrium value of the finite n-horizon game without discount. In this
paper, we will assume that V̄ ∗0 (x) = 0 for all x ∈ X.
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3 Receding Horizon Control
3.1 Infinite horizon discounted cost
As we mentioned before, solving a large-state space Markov games for infinite horizon costs is often
impractical. Therefore, we adopt a finite-horizon approximation scheme for the infinite horizon
problem. We select a small but typical horizon and solve for the Markov game with the finite
horizon (in our case, we are interested in only the optimal current or initial randomized actions for
the minimizer and the maximizer). That is, we solve the Markov game with the total discounted
cost criterion at each decision time. The intuition is that if the fixed horizon is “long” enough to get
a stationary behavior of the system, this moving horizon control would have a good performance.
Indeed, we show that the value of the game of the receding horizon control converges geometrically
to the equilibrium value, uniformly in the initial state, as the value of the moving horizon increases.
The receding horizon control is simply defined as follows. Given a finite horizon H ≥ 1, we
define the receding H-horizon control as a policy π∗H ∈ Π for the minimizer and a policy φ∗H ∈ Φ
for the maximizer such that Tπ∗H ,φ∗H (V
∗
H−1)(x) = T (V
∗
H−1)(x) for all x ∈ X. Note that the receding
H-horizon control policy is a stationary policy. We have the following bound on the performance
error.
Theorem 3.1 For all x ∈ X,
|V ∗∞(x)− V∞(π∗H , φ∗H)(x)| ≤
γH(2− γ)
(1− γ)2 · 2Cmax
Proof: See the proof of Theorem 3.6 below with ε = 0 and n = H − 1.
We remark that the same result can be obtained alternatively from Lemma 4.3.5 in page 181
in [18] via a simple algebraic manipulation.
From the theorem above, we can see that the receding horizon control gives a good approxi-
mation for the infinite horizon equilibrium policy for each player, and the value of the game using
these policies approaches to the equilibrium performance for the infinite horizon cost geometrically
in γ. Furthermore, by letting γ
H(2−γ)
(1−γ)2 ·2Cmax = ε, we can obtain the necessary value of the planning
horizon which guarantees that the performance of the receding horizon control will be within ε of
the equilibrium value.
The minimizer will play the game by the receding horizon control based on correlated equilib-
rium. That is, he assumes that the maximizer also plays the common copy of the receding horizon
control. We need to analyze the error bound when the maximizer’s play is the true worst case
scenario, φ∗. We begin with a lemma regarding the monotonicity property of the Tπ,φ-operator.
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Lemma 3.1 For any π ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ, suppose there exists ψ ∈ B(X) for which Tπ,φ(ψ)(x) ≤ ψ(x)
for all x ∈ X; then V∞(π, φ)(x) ≤ ψ(x) for all x ∈ X.
The above lemma can be easily proven by the monotonicity property of the operator Tπ,φ and the
convergence to the unique fixed point of V∞(π, φ) from successive applications of the operator. The
next lemma states that the function V ∗n is non-increasing in n under a suitable initial condition and
is a simplified version of Lemma 3.1 in [45] in our context. We provide the proof for completeness.
Lemma 3.2 Suppose V ∗0 is selected such that T (V
∗
0 )(x) ≤ V ∗0 (x) for all x ∈ X. Then, for H =
1, 2, ..., and for all x ∈ X, V ∗H(x) ≤ V ∗H−1(x).
Proof: The proof is by induction on H. For H = 1, since V ∗1 = T (V ∗0 ), we have V ∗1 (x) ≤ V ∗0 (x)
for all x ∈ X from the assumption.
Assuming that the assertion is true for H = 1, ..., k, we prove that it holds for H = k + 1. For
all x ∈ X,
V ∗k+1(x) = T (V
∗
k )(x)
= T (T (V ∗k−1))(x)
≤ T (V ∗k−1)(x) from the monotonicity of T and the assumption
= V ∗k (x),
which proves the claim.
We remark that one such V ∗0 can be simply given by V
∗
0 (x) = Cmax/(1 − γ) for all x ∈ X.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose V ∗0 is selected such that for all x ∈ X, T (V ∗0 )(x) ≤ V ∗0 (x). Then, for all
x ∈ X,
0 ≤ V∞(π∗H , φ∗)(x)− V ∗∞(x) ≤
γH
1− γ · 2Cmax




































H−1(y) by definition of φ
∗
H
= Tπ∗H ,φ∗H (V
∗
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Therefore, by Lemma 3.1, V∞(π∗H , φ
∗)(x) ≤ V ∗H(x) for all x ∈ X. It follows that for all x ∈ X,
V∞(π∗H , φ
∗)(x)− V ∗∞(x) ≤ V ∗H(x)− V ∗∞(x).
Observe that maxx |V ∗n (x)| ≤ Cmax1−γ for all n ≥ 0 under the assumption of V ∗0 . Therefore, for
n = 0, 1, ...,
max
x
|V ∗∞(x)− V ∗n (x)| ≤ γn maxx |V
∗
∞(x)− V ∗0 (x)| ≤
2Cmax
1− γ · γ
n. (1)
Combining the two inequalities, we have the desired result.
As we expected, the error bound vanishes to zero as the size of the horizon increases to infinity
geometrically fast with a given discount factor.
Consider the following condition: there exists a function δ defined on X such that 0 <∑
x∈X δ(x) < 1 and Pxy(f, g) ≥ δ(y) for all x, y, g, f . It turns out that if the given Markov
game meets this condition, the error bounds in the above theorems can be improved by a fac-
tor (1 −∑x δ(x))H as in the MDP case [23]. Let β = 1 −∑x δ(x). Now define two probability
distributions P ′ and ψ such that
ψ(x) =
1
1− β δ(x), x ∈ X.
P ′xy(f, g) =
1
β
[Pxy(f, g)− (1− β)ψ(y)].
Then, we can define a transition probability P by
Pxy(f, g) = βP ′xy(f, g) + (1− β)ψ(y).
We further define the operator T ′ : B(X) → B(X) as in T except that we use P ′ instead of P .
Then, for any function v ∈ B(X), the T and T ′ operators are related by




Let {V ′n} be the sequence of value iteration functions with respect to T ′, V ′n := T ′(V ′n−1) where
n = 1, 2, ... and set V ∗0 (x) = V ′0(x) = Cmax/(1− γ) for all x ∈ X. By induction, we can show that
V ∗n (x) = V
′
n(x) + Cn, x ∈ X. (2)
where Cn is the constant given by
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setting V ∗k to the zero function for k < 0 if n ≥ 1 and C0 = 0. From this, we can conclude that
(c.f., Lemma 4.1 in [23])
V ∗∞(x) = V
′
∞(x) + C(γ, β)ψ(V
∗
∞), x ∈ X,
where V ′∞ = limn→∞ T n(V ′0) and C(γ, β) = γ(1 − β)/(1 − γβ). Observe that V ′∞ is the optimal
equilibrium value function for the underlying Markov game replaced with P ′ and discount factor
γβ. By the same arguments, we can show that for any π ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ,
V∞(π, φ)(x) = V ′∞(π, φ)(x) + C(γ, β)ψ(V∞(π, φ)), x ∈ X.
This immediately implies that
V ∗∞(x)− V∞(π∗H , φ∗H)(x) = V ′∞(x)− V ′∞(π∗H , φ∗H)(x) + C(γ, β)ψ(V ∗∞ − V∞(π∗H , φ∗H)).
Observe that a policy pair π ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ such that T ′π,φ(V ′H−1)(x) = T ′(V ′H−1)(x) for all
x ∈ X prescribes the same randomized action choice as π∗H and φ∗H from the relationship given by
Equation (2). Now, by majorization of V ∗∞(x) − V∞(π∗H , φ∗H)(x) and from Theorem 3.1 with the
observation just made, it follows that
max
x
[V ∗∞(x)−V∞(π∗H , φ∗H)(x)] ≤
(γβ)H(2− γβ)
(1− γβ)2 ·2Cmax+C(γ, β)maxx [V
∗
∞(x)−V∞(π∗H , φ∗H)(x)], x ∈ X.
We can also minorize V ∗∞(x)− V∞(π∗H , φ∗H)(x), from which we conclude that for all x ∈ X,
|V ∗∞(x)− V∞(π∗H , φ∗H)(x)| ≤ [1− C(γ, β)]−1 ·
(γβ)H (2− γβ)
(1− γβ)2 · 2Cmax.
The upper bound on Theorem 3.2 can also be improved by a factor of βH with the same arguments.
3.2 Infinite horizon average cost
The receding horizon control is defined as follows. Given a finite horizon H ≥ 1, we define the
receding H-horizon control as a policy π∗H ∈ Π for the minimizer and a policy φ∗H ∈ Φ for the
maximizer such that T̄π∗H ,φ∗H (V̄
∗
H−1)(x) = T̄ (V̄
∗
H−1)(x) for all x ∈ X. We now present the perfor-
mance error of the receding horizon control in terms of the infinite horizon average cost comparing
with the equilibrium value under our assumptions on Markov games. The analysis primarily builds
on the work by Van der Wal [46]. We begin with a modified version of Van der Wal’s Corollary
13.2 in page 230 in [46] within our context. For a function v ∈ B(X), let span semi-norm of v be
sp(v) = maxx v(x)−minx v(x).
Theorem 3.3 Assume that Assumption 2.1 holds. For any V ∈ B(X), consider two policies π ∈ Π
and φ ∈ Φ such that T̄π,φ(V )(x) = T̄ (V )(x) for all x ∈ X. Then, for any π′ ∈ Π and φ′ ∈ Φ,
J∞(π, φ′) ≤ J∗∞ + sp(T (V )− V )
J∞(π′, φ) ≥ J∗∞ − sp(T (V )− V )
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From now on, we will set |X| = s (we naturally assume that s ≥ 1). Under the aperiodicity
assumption (the second part in Assumption 2.1), there exists a constant η, with 0 ≤ η < 1, such
that the following scrambling condition holds: for any π, π′ ∈ Π and any φ, φ′ ∈ Φ and for all
x, y ∈ X, ∑
z∈X
min{Ps−1x,π,φ(z),Ps−1y,π′,φ′(z)} ≥ 1− η,
where Ps−1x,π,φ(y) denotes the probability that the initial state x will reach the state z in s− 1 time
steps under the policies π and φ. We will refer to η as an ergodicity coefficient.
Lemma 3.3 Assume that Assumption 2.1 holds. For n = 0, 1, ..., sp(V̄ ∗n+1 − V̄ ∗n ) ≤ 2η
n
s−1Cmax
Proof: Van der Wal showed that (see page 235 in [46]) sp(V̄ ∗n+s − V̄ ∗n+s−1) ≤ η · sp(V̄ ∗n+1 − V̄ ∗n ),
n = 0, 1, ..., which implies that
sp(V̄ ∗n+1 − V̄ ∗n ) ≤ η
n
s−1 sp(V̄ ∗1 − V̄ ∗0 ) for n = 0, 1, ...
Since sp(V̄ ∗1 − V̄ ∗0 ) ≤ 2Cmax with V̄ ∗0 = 0, we have the desired result.
The theorem and the lemma above yield immediately the following result.
Theorem 3.4 Assume that Assumption 2.1 holds. Consider the receding H-horizon control π∗H ∈
Π for the minimizer and φ∗H ∈ Φ for the maximizer such that T̄π∗H ,φ∗H (V̄ ∗H−1)(x) = T̄ (V̄ ∗H−1)(x) for
all x ∈ X. Then,
|J∞(π∗H , φ∗H)− J∗∞| ≤ 2η
H−1
s−1 Cmax
We can see again that the receding horizon control for the average cost case also gives a good
approximation for the infinite horizon equilibrium policy for each player and the value of the game
by the policies approaches to the equilibrium performance for the infinite horizon average cost
geometrically in the ergodicity coefficient η. Furthermore, by letting 2η
H−1
s−1 Cmax = ε, we can
obtain the necessary value of the planning horizon which guarantees that the performance of the
receding horizon control will be within ε from the equilibrium value.
An error bound when the maximizer’s play is the true worst cast scenario φ∗ is also obtained
directly from Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.5 Assume that Assumption 2.1 holds. Consider the receding H-horizon control, π∗H ∈
Π for the minimizer such that T̄π∗H (V̄
∗
H−1)(x) = T̄ (V̄
∗
H−1)(x) for all x ∈ X. Then,
0 ≤ J∞(π∗H , φ∗)− J∗∞ ≤ 2η
H−1
s−1 Cmax
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The error bounds we presented above vanish geometrically to zero as the size of the horizon
increases to infinity. However, it depends on the size of the state space. Therefore, if s is a huge
number, the error bound will be large with relatively small H. We now add a new condition to
the transition probability matrix so that we can eliminate the dependence on the size of the state
space.
Assumption 3.1 There exists a nonnegative function µ ∈ B(X) such that for some constant α,
with 0 ≤ α < 1, ∑
y∈X
Pxy(π(y), φ(y))µ(y) ≤ αµ(x)
for all x ∈ X, π ∈ Φ, and φ ∈ Φ.
We will refer to this assumption as the µ-recurrent condition [17].
We define the µ-norm of a function v ∈ B(X), ‖v‖µ given by
‖v‖µ = inf{c ∈ R| |v(x)| ≤ cµ(x),∀x ∈ X}.
It is well-known that under the recurrent condition, T̄ is a contraction mapping with respect to
µ-norm. That is, for any v,w ∈ B(X),
‖T̄ (v)− T̄ (w)‖µ ≤ α‖v − w‖µ.
Furthermore, it can then be easily proven (see, e.g., page 199 in [46]) that for any x ∈ X and for
any v,w ∈ B(X),
−αµ(x)‖v − w‖µ ≤ T̄ (v)(x) − T̄ (w)(x) ≤ αµ(x)‖v − w‖µ.
It follows that for n = 1, 2, ...,
sp(V̄ ∗n+1 − V̄ ∗n ) ≤ 2αmaxx µ(x)‖V̄
∗
n − V̄ ∗n−1‖µ ≤ 2αn maxx µ(x)‖V̄
∗
1 − V̄ ∗0 ‖µ = 2αn maxx µ(x)‖V̄
∗
1 ‖µ.
Because ‖V̄ ∗1 ‖µ ≤ Cmax1−α (see, e.g., page 199 in [46]), we have the following immediate result with
µ-recurrent condition.
Proposition 3.1 Assume that Assumptions 2.1 and 3.1 hold. Consider the receding H-horizon
control, π∗H ∈ Π for the minimizer and φ∗H ∈ Φ for the maximizer such that T̄π∗H ,φ∗H (V̄ ∗H−1)(x) =
T̄ (V̄ ∗H−1)(x) for all x ∈ X. Then under the µ-recurrent condition,
|J∞(π∗H , φ∗H)− J∗∞| ≤
αH−1
1 − α · 2Cmax maxx µ(x)
0 ≤ J∞(π∗H , φ∗)− J∗∞ ≤
αH−1
1 − α · 2Cmax maxx µ(x).
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Therefore, the above theorem establishes the geometric convergence of the receding horizon
control independently of the state space size. To apply the receding horizon control, we need to
know the exact value of the finite horizon subgames. However, in practice, getting the true (H−1)-
horizon equilibrium value, in order for the minimizer to get the receding H-horizon control policy, is
also troublesome if the state-space size is huge. Motivated by this, we now analyze the approximate
receding horizon control.
3.3 Analysis of approximate receding horizon control
3.3.1 Infinite horizon discounted cost
We start with lemmas to state our main result for the approximate receding horizon control.
Lemma 3.4 For all x ∈ X and n = 0, 1, ...,
|V ∗n+1(x)− V ∗n (x)| ≤
γn
1− γ · 2Cmax
Proof: This is directly obtained from the contraction mapping property.
The theorem below states an error bound from the equilibrium value of the game when both
the minimizer and the maximizer play the receding horizon control based on the same approximate
value, i.e., correlated equilibrium policies.
Theorem 3.6 Given V ∈ B(X) such that for some n ≥ 0, |V ∗n (x) − V (x)| ≤ ε for all x in X,
consider a policy π for the minimizer and φ for the maximizer such that for all x ∈ X, Tπ,φ(V )(x) =
T (V )(x). Then, for all x ∈ X,
|V ∗∞(x)− V∞(π, φ)(x)| ≤
γn+1(2− γ)
(1− γ)2 · 2Cmax +
2γε
1− γ
Proof: From the contraction mapping property of the T operator, for all x in X,
|T (V ∗n )(x)− T (V )(x)| ≤ γ ·maxx |V
∗
n (x)− V (x)| ≤ γε (4)
and from T (V ∗∞) = V ∗∞ and a successive application of the contraction property we have
max
x
|V ∗∞(x)− V ∗n+1(x)| ≤ γn+1 maxx |V
∗
∞(x)− V ∗0 (x)| ≤
2Cmax
1− γ · γ
n+1. (5)
Therefore, from Equation (4) and (5) and V ∗n+1 = T (V
∗
n ) by definition, for all x ∈ X,
|V ∗∞(x)− T (V )(x)| ≤ |V ∗∞(x)− T (V ∗n )(x)|+ |T (V ∗n )(x)− T (V )(x)|
≤ 2Cmax
1− γ · γ
n+1 + γε. (6)
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Below we show that |T (V )(x)−V∞(π, φ)(x)| ≤ γε(1+γ)1−γ + 2Cmaxγ
n+1
(1−γ)2 for all x ∈ X. It then follows
that from Equation (6), for all x ∈ X,
|V ∗∞(x)− V∞(π, φ)(x)| ≤ |V ∗∞(x)− T (V )(x)|+ |T (V )(x)− V∞(π, φ)(x)|
≤ 2Cmax








(1− γ)2 · 2Cmax +
2γε
1− γ ,
which gives the desired result.
From Lemma 3.4 and Equation (4), we have that for all x ∈ X, by letting w = γn1−γ · 2Cmax,
V (x) ≤ V ∗n (x) + ε ≤ V ∗n+1(x) + ε+ w ≤ T (V )(x) + γε+ ε+ w. (7)
Then for all x ∈ X,
T (V )(x) = Tπ,φ(V )(x) = Cx(π(x), φ(x)) + γ
∑
y∈X
Pxy(π(x), φ(x))V (y) by definitions of π and φ and T
≤ Cx(π(x), φ(x)) + γ
∑
y∈X
Pxy(π(x), φ(x))[T (V )(y) + γε+ ε+ w] by Equation (7)
= Cx(π(x), φ(x)) + γ
∑
y∈X
Pxy(π(x), φ(x))T (V )(y) + γε(1 + γ) + γw










+γε(1 + γ) + γw









Pxy(π(x), φ(x))Pyz(π(y), φ(y))V (z) + γε(1 + γ) + γw









Pxy(π(x), φ(x))Pyz(π(y), φ(y))T (V )(z)
+γ2ε(1 + γ) + γε(1 + γ) + (γ2w + γw)
Keep iterating (under the sum sign) this way, we have that for all k = 0, 1, ..., and x ∈ X,




γtCxt(π(xt), φ(xt))|x0 = x
]
+ γk+1E[T (V )(xk+1)|x0 = x]
+γε(1 + γ) + · · · + γk+1ε(1 + γ) + (γw + · · ·+ γk+1w), (8)
where xt is the random variable representing the state at time t under π and φ. Since T (V ) is
bounded, the second term on the r.h.s. of Equation (8) converges to zero as k → ∞ and the
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first term becomes V∞(π, φ)(x). Therefore it follows that T (V )(x) − V∞(π, φ)(x) ≤ γε(1+γ)1−γ + γw1−γ .
Therefore, T (V )(x)− V∞(π, φ)(x) ≤ γε(1+γ)1−γ + 2Cmaxγ
n+1
(1−γ)2 for all x ∈ X.
Similarly, we can show that T (V )(x) − V∞(π, φ)(x) ≥ −γε(1+γ)1−γ − 2Cmaxγ
n+1
(1−γ)2 for all x ∈ X by
the observation that from the assumption and Equation (4), we have that for all x ∈ X,
V (x) ≥ V ∗n (x)− ε ≥ V ∗n+1(x)− ε− w ≥ T (V )(x) − γε− ε− w.
From the approximate receding horizon control framework, given an approximate function V , the
minimizer will play the policy π such that Tπ,φ = T (V ) at each x ∈ X. That is, he will assume
that the maximizer will play the correlated equilibrium policy with respect to V . We now present
the game of value when the maximizer actually plays the worst-case scenario.
Theorem 3.7 Suppose V ∗0 is selected such that for all x ∈ X, T (V ∗0 )(x) ≤ V ∗0 (x). Given V ∈ B(X)
such that for some n ≥ 0, |V ∗n (x)− V (x)| ≤ ε for all x in X, consider a policy π for the minimizer
such that for all x ∈ X, Tπ(V )(x) = T (V )(x). Then, for all x ∈ X,
0 ≤ V∞(π, φ∗)(x)− V ∗∞(x) ≤
γn+1
1− γ · 2Cmax +
2γε
1− γ
Before we provide a proof of this theorem, we mention here that setting ε = 0 with n = H − 1
gives exactly the bound of Theorem 3.2. Even though we could have obtained the result for
Theorem 3.2 by setting ε = 0 with n = H − 1 here, we wanted to show that there is an alternate
but simpler proof than the proof below.
Proof: The lower bound is trivially true so we prove the upper bound. The proof technique is
quite similar to the proof of the previous theorem.
For all x ∈ X, V∞(π, φ∗)(x) − V ∗∞(x) = V∞(π, φ∗)(x)− T (V )(x) + T (V )(x)− V ∗∞(x). We have
that T (V )(x)−V ∗∞(x) ≤ γε+ γ
n+12Cmax
1−γ (see the proof of the previous theorem). It remains to show
that V∞(π, φ∗)− T (V )(x) ≤ γε(1+γ)1−γ .
Now, for all x ∈ X, −γε+ T (V )(x) ≤ V ∗n+1(x) ≤ V ∗n (x) ≤ V (x) + ε, where the first inequality
is from Equation (4) and the second inequality is from Lemma 3.2 and the third inequality is from
the assumption. It follows that
T (V )(x) = Tπ(V )(x) = sup
f∈F (x)











≥ Cx(π(x), φ∗(x)) + γ
∑
y∈X
Pxy(π(x), φ∗(x))[T (V )(y)− ε(1 + γ)]
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Keep iterating (under the sum sign) this way, we have that for all k = 0, 1, ..., and x ∈ X,







+ γk+1E[T (V )(xk+1)|x0 = x]
−[γε(1 + γ) + · · ·+ γk+1ε(1 + γ)], (9)
where xt is the random variable representing the state at time t under π and φ∗. Since T (V ) is
bounded, the second term on the r.h.s. of Equation (9) converges to zero as k → ∞ and the first
term becomes V∞(π, φ)(x). Therefore it follows that T (V )(x) − V (π, φ∗)(x) ≥ −γε(1+γ)1−γ .
As we have studied in subsection 3.1, if there exists a function δ defined on X such that
0 <
∑
x∈X δ(x) < 1 and Pxy(f, g) ≥ δ(y) for all x, y, g, f , the error bounds above can be improved.
Let β = 1−∑x δ(x) again. We only present the upper bound case of Theorem 3.6 as an example.
With the same arguments given in subsection 3.1,
max
x
[V ∗∞(x)− V∞(π, φ)(x)] ≤ [1− C(γ, β)]−1 maxx [V
′




[V ′∞(x)− V ′∞(π, φ)(x)] ≤
(γβ)n+1(2− γβ)
(1− γβ)2 · 2Cmax +
2γβε′
1− γβ
if V (x)− V ′n(x) ≤ ε′. But ε′ = ε+ Cn where Cn is given in Equation (3).
3.3.2 Infinite horizon average cost
Theorem 3.8 Assume that Assumption 2.1 holds. Given V ∈ B(X) such that for some n ≥ 0,
|V̄ ∗n (x)− V (x)| ≤ ε for all x in X, consider a policy π for the minimizer and φ for the maximizer
such that for all x ∈ X, T̄π,φ(V )(x) = T̄ (V )(x). Then, for all x ∈ X,
|J∗∞(π, φ) − J∗∞| ≤ 2η
n
s−1Cmax + 4ε.
0 ≤ J∗∞(π, φ∗)− J∗∞ ≤ 2η
n
s−1Cmax + 4ε.
Proof: From the assumption, −ε ≤ V̄ ∗n (x) − V (x) ≤ ε for all x ∈ X. Applying the T̄ -operator
to each side and using the monotonicity property, we have −ε ≤ T̄ (V ∗n )(x) − T̄ (V )(x) ≤ ε for all
x ∈ X. Therefore we have that
sp(T̄ (V )− V ) ≤ sp(V̄ ∗n+1 − V̄ ∗n ) + 4ε.
Applying Theorem 3.3, we have the result. The error bound on the value of the game when the
maximizer actually plays the worst-case scenario is also directly obtained from Theorem 3.3.
We remark that we can add the µ-recurrent condition (Assumption 3.1) to this case also so that
we can eliminate the dependence on the state space size as we did previously.
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4 Examples of Approximate Receding Horizon Control
In this section, we introduce three approaches as examples of approximate receding horizon control
for the Markov games. These are heuristics for the minimizer who seeks to optimize his performance
under the guess of the worst-case scenario from the opponent’s play. The first two approaches (to
the minimizer) aim at improving a given heuristic policy (or a set of multiple heuristic policies)
that is available to the minimizer, based on the policy improvement arguments. The final approach
is motivated by hindsight optimization proposed in [13, 16]. By this approach, at each state, the
minimizer evaluates his candidate randomized actions based on the analysis of the expected optimal
hindsight performance over a finite horizon under the guess that the maximizer plays the worst-case
fixed policy chosen by the minimizer.
4.1 Rollout algorithm
Our discussion in this subsection will focus on the discounted case first and then consider the
average case. To the minimizer, obtaining an equilibrium policy for him is often quite difficult
due to the curse of dimensionality. One approach to take when a heuristic policy is available to
the minimizer is to assume that the maximizer has chosen a fixed policy φ ∈ Φ to play the given
Markov game and then to try to improve the heuristic policy of the minimizer. Because it is also
difficult for the minimizer to get the worst case policy (the equilibrium policy for the maximizer),
the minimizer will need to choose a heuristic worst case policy for the maximizer. For some cases,
we can actually get φ∗ (see, e.g., [1] and the references therein). If we fix the maximizer’s policy,
the resulting game becomes a Markov decision process to the minimizer. It is well-known from
the policy improvement principle that given a policy π, if we define a new policy πro such that
Tπro,φ(V∞(π, φ))(x) = Tφ(V∞(π, φ))(x) for all x ∈ X, the new policy πro improves the policy π in
terms of the infinite horizon discounted cost. That is, V∞(πro, φ) ≤ V∞(π, φ). Because this holds
for arbitrary φ ∈ Φ, πro dominates π.
Several works for MDP problems (with their related cost function) in this respect have reported
successful results. For example, Bertsekas and Castanon consider stochastic scheduling problems [9],
Secomandi [43] studied a vehicle routing problem, Ott and Krishnan [37] and Kolarov and Hui [30]
studied network routing problems, Bhulai and Koole [11] consider a multi-server queueing problem,
and Koole and Nain [32] consider a two-class single-server queueing model under a preemptive
priority rule. In particular, [11] and [32] obtain explicit expressions for the value function of a fixed
threshold policy, which plays the role of a heuristic base policy, and showed numerically that the
rollout of the policy behaves almost optimally. Chang et al. [14] also empirically showed the rollout
of a fixed threshold policy (Droptail) works well for a buffer management problem. Koole [31] also
derived the deviation matrix of the M/M/1/∞ and M/M/1/N queue, which is used for computing
the bias vector for a particular choice of cost function and a certain base policy, from which the
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rollout policy of the base policy is generated. Note that in queueing systems viewed as Markov
games, we can consider a worst-case arrival process and then analyze the value function of a certain
fixed policy with the worst-case arrival process, from which we generate a rollout policy for the
minimizer.
As a receding horizon approach for this improvement scheme, we replace V∞(π, φ) by the
value of the game when the policies π and φ are followed over a finite horizon. Formally,
we define the H-horizon rollout policy πro,H with a base policy π to be a policy πro,H that
satisfies Tπro,H ,φ(VH−1(π, φ))(x) = Tφ(VH−1(π, φ))(x) for all x ∈ X where VH−1(π, φ) :=
E{∑H−2t=0 γtCxt(π(xt), φ(xt))|x0 = x}.
We present the result regarding the H-horizon rollout policy adapted from [13] and provide the
proof for completeness. We first begin with a lemma similar to Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose V0(π, φ) is selected such that for all x ∈ X, Tπ,φ(V0(π, φ))(x) ≤ V0(π, φ)(x).
Then, for H = 1, 2, ..., and for all x ∈ X, VH(π, φ)(x) ≤ VH−1(π, φ)(x).
Proof: The statement can be proven by induction on H as in the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Proposition 4.1 Given a fixed policy φ ∈ Φ and a base policy π ∈ Π for the minimizer, suppose
V0(π, φ) is selected such that Tπ,φ(V0(π, φ))(x) ≤ V0(π, φ)(x) for all x ∈ X. For any ε > 0, if
H ≥ 1 + logγ ε(1−γ)Cmax , then for all x ∈ X, V∞(πro,H , φ)(x) ≤ V∞(π, φ)(x) + ε.
Proof: Define ψ = VH−1(π, φ). By definition of the rollout policy,




≤ Cx(π(x), φ(x)) + γ
∑
y∈X
Pxy(π(x), φ(x))ψ(y) = VH(π, φ)(x) ≤ ψ(x),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.1. Therefore, for all x ∈ X, we have
V∞(πro,H , φ)(x) ≤ VH−1(π, φ)(x) by Lemma 3.1. Now we can write for all x ∈ X, V∞(π, φ)(x) =
VH−1(π, φ)(x) + γH−1E[V∞(π, φ)(xH−1)|x0 = x]. We know that minx[V∞(π, φ)(x)] ≥ −Cmax1−γ . This
implies that V∞(πro,H , φ)(x) ≤ V∞(π, φ)(x)+ Cmax1−γ ·γH−1. Letting Cmax1−γ ·γH−1 ≤ ε yields the desired
result.
We note again that the minimizer is assuming the maximizer’s play. If the minimizer’s guess
on the worst-cast scenario is good in the sense that maxx |VH−1(π, φ)(x) − V ∗H−1(x)| ≤ ε with a
relative small value, the resulting performance will be bounded by Theorem 3.7 from the optimal
equilibrium performance.
The average case is similar to the discounted case except that we define the rollout pol-
icy with respect to “T̄”-operators — the rollout policy is defined as a policy such that
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T̄πro,H ,φ(V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) = T̄φ(V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) for all x ∈ X where V̄H−1 is obtained with γ = 1
in VH−1 and we assume that V̄0(π, φ) is zero function. The principle behind this is also the policy
improvement scheme (see, e.g., [26]) under the assumptions we made for the average Markov games,
i.e., aperiodicity and irreducibility.
Proposition 4.2 Assume that Assumption 2.1 holds. Consider the H-horizon rollout policy πro,H
with a base policy π with respect to φ ∈ Φ. Then
J∞(πro,H , φ) ≤ J∞(π, φ) + 2η
H−1
s−1 Cmax.
To prove the above proposition, we start with a lemma, which can be proven by the invariance
property [23] of the stationary distribution of the underlying Markov chain (see, e.g., [15]). Note
that under our assumptions, there exists a stationary distribution over X under any policy pair.
Lemma 4.2 For any π ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ, a stationary distribution P π,φ over X exists, and for all




[V̄n+1(π, φ)(y) − V̄n(π, φ)(y)]P π,φ(y).





[Tφ(V )(y)− V (y)]P π,φ(y).
Lemma 4.3 For n = 0, 1, ...,, and any π ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ,
max
x
[V̄n+1(π, φ)(x) − V̄n(π, φ)(x)] ≤ J∞(π, φ) + 2η
n
s−1Cmax
Proof: As in the statement of Lemma 3.3, we can show that for n = 0, 1, ..., sp(V̄n+1(π, φ) −
V̄n(π, φ)) ≤ 2η
n




[V̄n+1(π, φ)(x) − V̄n(π, φ)(x)] ≤ J∞(π, φ) ≤ max
x
[V̄n+1(π, φ)(x) − V̄n(π, φ)(x)].
It follows that maxx[V̄n+1(π, φ)(x)− V̄n(π, φ)(x)]−J∞(π, φ) ≤ sp(V̄n+1(π, φ)− V̄n(π, φ)). Therefore
the result follows.
We are now ready to prove the proposition above.
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Proof:
J∞(πro,H , φ) =
∑
x
[T̄φ(V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) − V̄H−1(π, φ)(x)]P πro,H ,φ(x) from Lemma 4.2
≤ max
x
(T̄φ(V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) − V̄H−1(π, φ)(x))
≤ max
x
(V̄H(π, φ)(x) − V̄H−1(π, φ)(x))
≤ J∞(π, φ) + 2η
H−1
s−1 Cmax from Lemma 4.3
Therefore, if H ≥ 1 + (s− 1) logη εCmax , the rollout policy dominates the heuristic base policy by ε.
By adding the µ-recurrent condition, the similar result can be obtained.
4.2 Parallel rollout
When a good heuristic policy is available to the minimizer and a fixed worst-case policy can be
assumed for the maximizer, the performance of the rollout policy played by the minimizer will
be promising because it will improve the performance of the heuristic policy for the minimizer.
However, often getting a good heuristic policy to roll out is very difficult. This will be particularly
true for the case where for some trajectories of the states, a heuristic policy is good and for other
trajectories of the states, another heuristic policy is good, etc. As a simple example, for a multiclass
scheduling problem where the cost is a function of the delay and the (importance) weight of the
class, the performances of the static priority policy and the earliest deadline first policy depend on
the system trajectories (see [13] for a detailed discussion).
As a generalization of the rollout approach, we consider a finite set of multiple heuristic policies.
The minimizing player seeks to combine dynamically the given heuristic policies in the set to adapt
to the different trajectories of the system to improve the performance of all policies in the set under
the assumption that the maximizing player plays a fixed worst-case policy chosen by the minimizer.
As in the rollout algorithm discussion, we first study the discounted cost case and then the average
cost case.
As we mentioned before, if we fix the maximizer’s policy, the resulting game becomes a Markov
decision process to the minimizer. Consider a finite set Λ ⊂ Π. It has been shown in [13] that
if we define a new policy πpr such that Tπpr,φ(minπ∈Λ V∞(π, φ))(x) = Tφ(minπ∈Λ V∞(π, φ))(x)
for all x ∈ X, where min is defined componentwise on X, the new policy πpr improves all of
the policies in Λ in terms of the infinite horizon discounted cost (to see this, we simply show
that Tπpr ,φ(minπ∈Λ V∞(π, φ))(x) ≤ minπ∈Λ V∞(π, φ)(x) for all x ∈ X). That is, for all x ∈ X,
V∞(πpr, φ)(x) ≤ minπ∈Λ V∞(π, φ)(x). Therefore, πpr dominates any policy π ∈ Λ.
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As we have done for the rollout approach, we define formally the H-horizon parallel roll-
out policy πpr,H with a finite set Λ of base policies π ∈ Π to be a policy such that
Tπpr,H ,φ(minπ∈Λ VH−1(π, φ))(x) = Tφ(minπ∈Λ VH−1(π, φ))(x) for all x ∈ X.
We now give the main result regarding the H-horizon parallel rollout policy. It states that
the parallel rollout policy dominates any policy in Λ by a small error, which is determined by the
receding horizon size.
Proposition 4.3 Let Λ ⊂ Π be a nonempty finite set of stationary policies. Given a fixed policy
φ ∈ Φ for the maximizer, suppose for each π ∈ Λ, V0(π, φ) is selected such that for all x ∈ X,
Tπ,φ(V0(π, φ))(x) ≤ V0(π, φ)(x). For πpr,H defined on Λ and played by the minimizer, given any
ε > 0, if H ≥ 1 + logγ ε(1−γ)Cmax , then for all x ∈ X, V∞(πpr,H , φ)(x) ≤ minπ∈Λ V∞(π, φ)(x) + ε.
Proof: The idea of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 4.1. We define ψ(x) =
minπ∈Λ VH−1(π, φ)(x) for all x ∈ X.








for any π ∈ Λ from the definition of πpr,H
= VH(π, φ)(x) ≤ VH−1(π, φ)(x) by the given assumption and Lemma 3.2
It follows that Tπpr,H ,φ(ψ)(x) ≤ ψ(x) for all x ∈ X. Therefore, for all x ∈ X, we have
V∞(πpr,H , φ)(x) ≤ minπ∈Λ VH−1(π, φ)(x) by Lemma 3.1. We know that V∞(πpr,H , φ)(x) ≤
minπ∈Λ V∞(π, φ)(x)+ Cmax1−γ ·γH−1 (c.f., Proposition 4.1). Letting Cmax1−γ ·γH−1 ≤ ε yields the desired
result.
For the average cost case, the definition of the parallel rollout policy in the discounted case is
replaced with “T̄”-operator and V̄H−1. That is, the H-horizon parallel rollout policy πpr,H with a
finite set Λ of base policies π ∈ Π with respect to a policy φ ∈ Φ is defined as a policy such that
T̄πpr,H ,φ(minπ∈Λ V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) = T̄φ(minπ∈Λ V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) for all x ∈ X.
We first analyze the performance of the H-horizon parallel rollout policy compared with those
obtained by policies in Λ. For this purpose, for any π ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ, define Jπ,φn (x) = V̄n(π,φ)(x)n for
all x ∈ X and n = 1, 2, .... That is, this is the n-horizon approximation of the value of the game for
the average cost when the minimizer plays π and the maximizer plays φ. With similar arguments
as Platzman’s given in Section 3.3 in [41], we can show that Jπ,φn (x) converges, uniformly in x, as
O(n−1), to J∞(π, φ), n = 1, 2, ....
Theorem 4.1 Assume that Assumption 2.1 holds. Consider the H-horizon parallel rollout policy
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πro,H with a finite set Λ ⊂ Π with respect to a policy φ ∈ Φ. Then






πpr,H ,φ(x) + 2η
H−1
s−1 Cmax.
Proof: We first observe that
T̄φ(min
π∈Λ
V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) = T̄πpr,H ,φ(min
π∈Λ
V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) by definition of πpr,H






≤ Cx(π(x), φ(x)) +
∑
y∈X
Pxy(π(x), φ(x))V̄H−1(π, φ)(y) for any π ∈ Λ
= V̄H(π, φ)(x).
Therefore, for all x ∈ X, T̄φ(minπ∈Λ V̄H−1(π, φ))(x) ≤ minπ∈Λ V̄H(π, φ)(x). Now,































πpr,H ,φ(x) + 2η
H−1
s−1 Cmax by Lemma 4.3 .
From the result given in the above theorem, we can now discuss the convergence rate of the H-
horizon parallel rollout policy. The second error term will approach zero geometrically in η as
H → ∞ and arg minπ∈Λ Jπ,φH−1(x) will approach to the policy arg minπ∈Λ Jπ,φ∞ in O(H−1). In the
limit, the parallel rollout policy will improve all policies in Λ. We remark that if for each π ∈ Λ,
V̄0(π, φ) is selected such that for all x ∈ X, T̄π,φ(V̄0(π, φ))(x) ≤ V̄0(π, φ)(x), then we can write the
result of the above theorem as follows:
J∞(πpr,H , φ) ≤ min
π∈Λ
J∞(π, φ) + 2η
H−1
s−1 Cmax.
We conclude the discussion of the (parallel) rollout with a remark on the minimizer’s guess of
the maximizer’s play. The above parallel rollout approach for the minimizer naturally gives a way
of guessing a worst-case scenario of the maximizer to the minimizer. Suppose the minimizer can
guess the best response from the maximizer when he plays a given heuristic policy π ∈ Λ. In this
case, the minimizer considers a finite set Ω ⊂ Φ of multiple heuristic policies for the maximizer
and defines a policy φmax(x) = arg maxφ∈Ω[minπ∈Λ V∞(π, φ)](x) for all x ∈ X, and uses the policy
φmax as the fixed policy for the maximizer.
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4.3 Hindsight optimization
The recently proposed approach called hindsight optimization [13] to solving Markov decision pro-
cesses can be also extended to solve Markov games if we fix a policy for the maximizer. Under the
assumption that the opponent (the maximizer) plays his best policy (chosen by the minimizer), the
hindsight optimizing minimizer plays the game at each state based on his analysis on the expected
optimal “retroactive” performance.







γtCxt(gt, φ(xt)) + γ
nV ∗0 (xn)|x0 = x
}
, gt ∈ G(xt) for all t (10)
and call this the “hindsight optimal” value of state x because it stands for the (expected) value
of taking (randomized) actions that the minimizer wishes to take if he encounters the particular
random trace of the game. For the average cost case, we simply set γ = 1 and refer to the value as
ρ̄n,φ(x).
Given a policy φ for the maximizer, we formally define the H-horizon hindsight optimization
policy as a policy πho,H such that for all x ∈ X, Tπho,H ,φ(ρH−1,φ)(x) = Tφ(ρH−1,φ)(x). The average
case is defined with “T̄ ”-operator with ρ̄H−1,φ. Because the minimization over the sequence of the
randomized actions is inside the expectation in Equation 10, this corresponds to solving the sample-
path problem, which is deterministic. The hindsight optimal value of state x is a lower bound to
the equilibrium value if we set φ = φ∗ because by Jensen’s inequality, ρn,φ(x) ≤ Vn(π̃, φ)(x) for any
π̃ ∈ Π̃ (for discounted case) and also ρ̄n,φ(x) ≤ V̄n(π̃, φ)(x) for any π̃ ∈ Π̃ (for average case).
It is quite difficult to give a bound on the hindsight optimal value without restrictive conditions
on the game. However, we believe that studying this issue is important. For this purpose, we
introduce an equivalent model description of Markov games. We can derive a function called the
next state function P̃ : X × G(X) × F (X) × [0, 1] → X from the transition function P . In other
words, given a policy pair π and φ and the current state x, a random number w selected uniformly
from [0,1] can be mapped to Pxy(π(x), φ(x)) for some y ∈ X. That is, xt+1 = P̃ (xt, at, wt) with
so-called random disturbance wt ∈ [0, 1]. The average payoff function C is also newly defined by C̃
such that Cx(π(x), φ(x)) = Ew(C̃x(π(x), φ(x), w)). See Bertsekas’ book of definitions on MDP [8]
or Ng’s deterministic (partially observable) MDP model for a related construction [36].
Now we define a function Q such that
Q(x0, π0, ..., πn−1, w0, ..., wn−1) =
n−1∑
t=0
γtC̃xt(πt(xt), φ(xt), wt) + γ
nV ∗0 (xn)
and for convenience, we will abbreviate this to Q(x0, π̃, ~w) in an obvious notation, where ~w =<
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because the minimization over nonstationary policy is equivalent to the minimization over the
(randomized) action sequences given ~w.
Proposition 4.4 Suppose C̃x(g, f, w) is convex as a function of g and w jointly for every fixed
x ∈ X and f ∈ F (x) and V ∗0 is convex as a function of x. Then, for all x ∈ X,
0 ≤ inf
π̃∈Π̃
Vn(π̃, φ)(x) − ρn,φ(x) ≤ Q(x, π̃0.5, ~0.5)− E~w[Q(x, π̃0.5, ~w)]
where ~0.5 is a vector of size n with every entry 0.5 and π̃0.5 solves inf π̃∈Π̃[Q(x, π̃, ~0.5)].
Proof: First, under our assumptions, the function Q is convex in the space of ~w and π̃ ([0, 1]n
and a cartesian product of polyhedral sets respectively), whose cartesian product space is a convex
set. Therefore, we can directly apply Avriel and Williams’ theorem on the Jensen’s inequality on
expected value of perfect information [22].
The same result holds for the average cost case (with γ = 1) and in particular if φ = φ∗, the
proposition above gives a bound between the hindsight optimal value and the n-horizon equilibrium
value.
We remark that the hindsight-optimization based approach appeals to the game-theoretic frame-
work so that this is different from the simulation-based approach used in the computer bridge game
player (GIB) in [20]. The approach taken there can be viewed as follows in the context of our dis-
cussion: many sample paths are drawn and for each sample path, the optimal solution with respect
to the sample path is analyzed after taking each deterministic candidate action, and one counts the
number of times that a particular deterministic action achieves the minimum cost sum, and takes
a deterministic action by voting. It would be interesting to compare two approaches in practical
applications.
5 Implementation and Research Directions
In this subsection, we briefly discuss how we can implement the (approximate) receding horizon
approaches we discussed before in practice and discuss some issues and directions for the future
research.
There is previous work done by Kearns et al. [28] that presents an algorithm that uses samples
to estimate V̄ ∗n (the undiscounted finite horizon value of game) within a given error bound, which
can be easily adapted to the discounted setting. They analyzed the necessary number of sampling
to obtain a desired accuracy. The per-state running time of their algorithm is independent of
the state space size but exponential in the horizon size. Note that finite horizon value iteration’s
computation complexity depends on the state space size, even though it depends on the horizon
size linearly, so that applying it for a game with a very large state space is difficult.
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The exponential dependence on the horizon size can be alleviated by using the three heuristic
approaches we discussed. We can simply use a Monte-Carlo simulation to estimate the relevant
function values. For example, the minimizer who uses the H-horizon rollout policy simulates the
given heuristic base policy and the fixed policy for the maximizer using sampling over a finite
horizon H − 1, and the results of the simulation are used to “select” the (apparently) best current
randomized action at the current state. We assume that there is a selection function available
that extracts the randomized action that achieves the infimum/supremum. The randomized action
selected is the randomized action with the highest “utility” at the current state, as estimated by
sampling. Of course, we can use various sampling techniques (see, e.g., [33]), such as importance
sampling, to improve the estimation procedure. Therefore, the rollout/parallel rollout approach is
practically viable. On the other hand, the hindsight optimization approach needs to have a fast
hindsight problem solver.
Extending the receding horizon framework to the N -person (N ≥ 3) case and analyzing the
performance will be difficult, because no iteration algorithm based on a contraction mapping is
available to the authors’ knowledge. However, each player can heuristically use the rollout/parallel
rollout and the hindsight optimization for his policy choice.
We can also consider applying the three heuristics to nonzero-sum stochastic games. Analyzing
the structure of equilibrium policies, in this case, is often more difficult than for zero-sum games.
For zero-sum games, a standard technique, e.g., value iteration, can be used (see, e.g., [1, 3] and
references therein). However, for nonzero-sum games, we need to use a different non-standard
technique (see, e.g., [2]) to analyze the structure, which is quite cumbersome.
Finally, we can incorporate the idea of Neuro-Dynamic programming (NDP) [10] into the ap-
proximate receding horizon control framework. That is, the feature-based approximations in NDP
can be applied when we estimate the value of the underlying subgame, although how to extract
good features is a difficult problem in general.
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